College of William & Mary Law School

William & Mary Law School Scholarship Repository
Faculty Publications

1982

Dealing with Terminally Ill Patients: An
Institutional Approach
Larry I. Palmer
William & Mary Law School

Repository Citation
Palmer, Larry I., "Dealing with Terminally Ill Patients: An Institutional Approach" (1982). Faculty Publications. 525.
https://scholarship.law.wm.edu/facpubs/525

Copyright c 1982 by the authors. This article is brought to you by the William & Mary Law School Scholarship Repository.
https://scholarship.law.wm.edu/facpubs

Faculty and Deans

Dealing with Terminally Ill Patients: An
Institutional Approach
Larry I. Palmer
Decisions about the care of hopelessly ill and dying patients
are never easy. At one time these decisions were private
matters; health care providers and the patient or his family
made decisions free from explicit scrutiny by others. Without much public knowledge the people directly affected
undertook to resolve the ethical and medical issues presented
by hopelessly ill and dying patients.
With the increased success of modern medicine in
helping people who have experienced a total cessation of
cognitive functions stay alive, public interest about the
decisions involved in such activities has increased. One
result of heightened public concern is that courts have begun
to play a role in monitoring the fate of irremediably ill or
dying patients. Judicial involvement has not produced or
revealed any societal consensus for dealing with these
patients. In fact, recent decisions involving terminally ill
patients have diverged in approach and outcome. No new
legal doctrine concerning when a patient has a "right to die"
emerges from these opinions. Furthermore, since decisions
implicating this right have become matters of public concern, the lack of social consensus about the methods and
desirability of preserving human life has been apparent.
In trying to answer the various issues put before them,
courts have looked to the doctor-patient relationship as a
framework for analysis. Under this approach the courts have
focused on structuring the decision making of the physician
and the patient or his representative. By emphasizing the
doctor-patient relationship, the courts have argued that
their analysis preserves "medical ethics." The various procedures devised by courts are thus vehicles for preserving the
value of life and diffusing responsibility for any decision.
I propose that the legal system should not focus exclusively on the doctor-patient relationship but instead become
more sensitive to the institutional arrangement in which
those doctor-patient relationships develop. Specifically,
courts should rely on the hospital to devise procedures for
I wish to acknowledge the help of Dr. H. Richard Beresford, who,
as a coteacher of the course on law and medicine, helped develop
the ideas in this essay and commented on earlier versions of it.
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Saint Clare's Hospital, scene of one of the first ''right-towithhold-treatment'' cases
considering issues involving terminally ill patients. As part
of my approach, the courts should be more explicit about the
relationship between legal rules and medical science. By
focusing on hospitals as institutions, the relationship between law and medicine could develop based on substantive
interaction rather than frozen archaic standards.
There are benefits to both law and medicine from the
adoption of an approach focused on the institutional settings
of most of these cases. First, the legal analyses and solutions
of the problems presented by these cases would be more
disease-specific; rather than focusing solely on the "rights" of
patients or physicians, the law would create a mechanism
that recognizes the complexity and uncertainty of medical
diagnosis and prognosis. Second, my approach would aid in
the resolution of ethical issues present in these cases by
frankly recognizing the role of other social institutions in
deciding whether treatment should be provided or withheld.
Third, I hope the proposed approach would lead legislatures
to develop legal standards on some of the other major issues.

Current Judicial Doctrines
The highest state courts in New Jersey, Massachusetts, and
New York have developed three different approaches to
cases involving hopelessly ill or dying patients. 1 As the first
step in demonstrating that these judicial opinions should be
viewed as involving the demarcation of roles rather than as
cases about rights (as claimed by all three courts), the three
doctrines will be briefly described and criticized.
New Jersey. Despite being heralded as the first important right-to-die case, In re Quinlan 2 may be idiosyncratic.
In Quinlan the New Jersey Supreme Court held that the
guardian of a twenty-two-year-old woman, her father, was
authorized to decide who should be Karen Ann Quinlan's
attending physicians. The court further held that if those
physicians and Quinlan's guardian concluded that there was
no possibility of Quinlan recovering, they should jointly
consult with a hospital body-called an ethics
committee3-about any decision to discontinue treatment.
If that committee agreed with the judgment of the guardian
and treating physicians that recovery was not possible, the
life-support treatment could be discontinued without liability on the part of any participant.
The Quinlan court had to assess issues of medical
diagnosis and prognosis and devise a procedure for action to
be taken. Karen Ann Quinlan was in a "persistent vegetative
coma" with irreversible brain damage. Her breathing was
assisted by a respirator. There was no clear explanation of
why she had lapsed into a coma. The limited number of
similar cases of young people in a persistent vegetative state
made prognosis difficult in her case. Karen Ann Quinlan
remains "alive" at the time of this writing, despite earlier
predictions of her likely death. Even though Karen Ann
Quinlan's condition was medically sui generis, the court, as
it derived its set of legal procedures, was fully informed of the
state of her medical condition. 4
The New Jersey doctrine was founded on the notion
that an adult patient has a constitutional right to privacy
that allows the patient or a representative to cease or curtail
treatment. The New Jersey court also implied that in some
circumstances it would not be necessary to come before a
court seeking declaratory relief but suggested that the use of
ethics committees by the hospitals would be an acceptable
means of approving the termination of treatment. Reliance
on ethics committees would provide immunity from both
civil and criminal liability. 5
Massachusetts. After Quinlan, the Supreme Judicial
Court of Massachusetts was presented with the case of
Belchertown State School v. Saikewicz. 6 Saikewicz was a
sixty-seven-year-old man with myeloblastic monocytic

leukemia. He was also severely mentally retarded, having an
IQ of ten and a mental age of about three years. Saikewicz
had been institutionalized for fifty-three years. The prognosis for his leukemia was discussed extensively.
Chemotherapy was recommended because 30 to 50 percent
of the patients with that form of leukemia are treated by
chemotherapy. While prognoses are difficult in cases of
leukemia, doctors estimated that if left untreated, a patient
in Saikewicz's condition and of his age would live for a matter
of weeks or perhaps months.
When presented with a request by the parties to
discontinue treatment, the court directed that a guardian be
appointed and that a lower court review any decision, even if
consented to by the guardian, to discontinue treatment of
Saikewicz. The Massachusetts court agreed with the Quinlan
court that the origin of the patient's right was Saikewicz's
constitutional right of privacy. The appointment of the
guardian was necessary because Saikewicz was legally incompetent and therefore had to have a representative. In this
respect his severe mental retardation was an important
aspect of the court's holding. The guardian was in effect
being asked to seek judicial authorization to exercise
Saikewicz's right of privacy and decline treatment. 7
Saikewicz does not accurately reflect current Massachusetts doctrine. The court first announced that under
some circumstances prior judicial approval was not required
before termination of treatment for an incompetent patient. 8 Then the Massachusetts court made it clear that the
constitutional right to decline treatment was not absolute,
since the court has ordered treatment for a competent adult
prisoner. 9 In its latest pronouncement, however, the Massachusetts court has reaffirmed the primary decisional role of
courts in these life-and-death cases by requiring prior judicial
approval before discontinuing treatment of an incompetent
patient. 10
The Massachusetts doctrine, in contrast to the New
Jersey doctrine, emphasizes judicial review. The New Jersey
doctrine saw the necessity of collective decision making by
hospital committees, attending physicians, and the patient's
representatives. Even though both doctrines are based on
notions of the patient's consitutional right to refuse treatment, one court sees the judiciary and another sees collective institutions as the interpreter of those rights.
New York. In a recent opinion, Matter of Storar, 11
involving two cases, the New York Court of Appeals
announced its position on how courts should respond to
hopelessly ill or dying patients. In the first of these cases,
involving Brother Fox, the court indicated that when there
is "clear and convincing proof' that a patient in a persistent
vegetative state previously indicated that he or she did not
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want life-supporting treatment, a guardian is authorized to
discontinue treatment. Under the court of appeals' view, the
guardian is not obligated to seek prior judicial approval of the
decision to withhold treatment. The court further held that
the authority to refuse treatment is grounded in common-law
notions, rather than in a constitutional right, as the lower
courts had assumed. 12
In a second case involving a different medical situation,
the legal analysis developed in Brother Fox's case was
applied. The patient, John M. Storar, was a fifty-two-yearold male who suffered from terminal bladder cancer. Lesions
in his bladder had led to internal bleeding. His physicians
ordered blood transfusions to sustain his life. The patient was
severely mentally retarded and had been institutionalized.
The patient's mother and guardian refused permission for the
transfusions, and the director of Storar's state residence
sought an order permitting the blood transfusions. The court
of appeals held that the judicial order for a blood transfusion
was appropriate, since the incompetent adult was like an
infant in the sense that he could not have expressed his
desires about life-sustaining treatment. 13
Comparison. There are significant differences in
analysis among the foregoing decisions. First, the source of
the "right to withhold treatment" exists as a matter of
constitutional law in Quinlan and Saikewicz and of common
law in Storar. The obvious implication of the difference is
that the New York court's analysis in Storar leaves theoretically greater latitude for legislative action. The New York
court explicitly invited legislative solutions. 14
Second, there is a difference in the judicial assessment
of which institution, if any, should ratify the decision to
withhold or curtail treatment. The New Jersey court placed
its faith in collective decision making-the guardian, the
hospital committee, the attending physician-outside the
court. The Massachusetts court insisted on judicial approval
of the decision to withhold treatment, except in some very
limited circumstances. The New York court indicated that
prior judicial approval was not required if there was clear
evidence of the patient's intentions in this type of situation.15
Third, since the various courts rely on different procedural devices in making decisions that come before them,
patients, relatives of patients, physicians, and hospitals are
encouraged to act in certain ways. Quinlan encourages
hospitals to establish prognosis committees to monitor
cessations of treatment. Saikewicz encourages parties to bring
most cases to courts for involvement in the decision to
withhold or discontinue treatment. Storar, by making the
"clear and convincing proof" determinative of the patient's
intentions, encourages the practice of writing "living wills,"
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where a prospective patient's attitudes toward life-sustaining
treatment can be expressed. 16
If the New York court's analysis were viewed as the high
point of development of an analysis for a new area of the law,
one might be reasonably satisfied with the two main features
of the doctrine:
1. A common-law right exists for persons, including incompetents, to choose to have life-sustaining treatment
withheld.
2. The right can be exercised without prior judicial supervision provided there is "clear and convincing evidence" of
the patient's intentions.
The New York doctrine might be viewed as sufficiently
attractive to justify its being adopted by other courts. But the
court of appeals is naive in its treatment of the degree of
medical uncertainty in most cases. As a result, while the
doctrine appears to be legally tidy, the court has not
established for the many cases standards of conduct that can
be applied easily.

An Institutional Solution: Legal Standards for Care
of Terminally Ill Patients
The courts' failure to evaluate the role of medical science in
their opinions has several important consequences. First, the
courts seem to recast the medical facts to fit their proposed
doctrines, ignoring medical and scientific uncertainty in
developing their legal analyses. Second, the role of competing institutions, such as families, state facilities for the
developmentally disabled, hospitals, and so on, is not openly
acknowledged in the judicial opinions.
In my view, since the decisions about terminally ill
patients are made within the institutional context of the
hospital, the hospital should establish a decision-making
process for the participants in the decision to discontinue or
withhold treatment. I suggest that hospitals should establish
medical prognosis committees to deal with patients. After
consulting with family, nurses, and others, the attending
physician should be required to bring before the committee
his or her request to terminate or curtail treatment to
patients in acute vegetative states, to patients suffering
certain degenerative brain diseases, or to patients who have
experienced "brain death." The committee would have the
responsibility to accept or reject the doctor's prognosis.
The primary purpose of this committee is to objectify
that which can be objectified, the medical prognosis. The
other purpose is to provide assurance to the hospital as an
institution that the various individuals within it are exercising their professional responsibilities vis-a-vis patients. This
committee is not an ethics committee that could legitimate a
decision to terminate treatment.
The consultation process is to ensure that the doctorpatient relationship is maintained as the fundamental basis
for ethical decisions. If the doctor is not willing to take
personal responsibility for the decision, he or she should not
propose to the patient or the patient's representative that a
certain action be taken. Ethics are a matter for all people in
the society, not simply the doctors involved.
If such committees were effective, perhaps legislatures
would be encouraged to enact legislation that would require
hospitals to have an additional committee to legitimate the
discontinuation of treatment. A bill might read something
like the following: "When death is a likely consequence for
an adult patient, no order to withhold or terminate treatment should be undertaken by a physician unless an appropriate hospital committee has reviewed and approved the
decision to withhold or terminate treatment." This broader
committee legislation would legitimate the proposed committees and create other committees to deal with aspects of
such cases other than medical prognosis. For instance, the

real problem in the case ofJohn Storar is that there is no one
to exercise the decision that the New York Court of Appeals
says is his to make. An appropriate committee for the Storar
case is a committee composed of employees of the state
residence where he lives, social workers, clergy, and
laypeople. Furthermore, a committee in Storar's case must
be able to support the physician's ethical decision as it
contends with the conflicting views of the guardian and the
state official. This second kind of committee would not
replace the refusal of a guardian or a competent individual or
an attending physician to curtail treatment.
These court cases present us with an opportunity to
think about structuring the legal system in such a way that
hospitals and other institutions could become more visible
and be given more credence. We could thus rely on the
health care institutions to help exercise control over the
professionals who are operating within these institutions. In
addition, we could allow medicine to play its appropriate role
in the society and allow law to play its role of providing order
in situations of deep conflict.
I am not offering a legal definition of death or the end of
all litigation concerning termination of treatment. Rather,
my approach to this issue allows law to leave some questions
unresolved, perhaps to be resolved by others outside the
institution of law.
The suggested approach reflects a belief that the lack of
social consensus about the care of hopelessly ill and dying
patients is a function of modern medicine itself. The
approach therefore encourages courts to define the role of
law in relation to the realities of modern medicine and to
avoid existing analyses of "consent" that provide little
practical guidance for health care providers or for their legal
consultants. The risk of the current approach of focusing on
the doctor-patient relationship is that law will be ignored,
either because it fails to take account of the value system of
modern medicine or because it inhibits the proper functioning of medicine-a major institution of the society.

Professor Palmer teaches criminal
law, criminal procedure, children
and the law, and law and medicine.
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1. Although I will focus only on New Jersey, Massachusetts, and
New York, the judiciaries of other states have also dealt with issues
surrounding the terminally ill [e.g., Satz v. Perlmutter, 3 79 So. 2d
359 (Fla. 1980)].
2. 70 N.J. 10, 355 A. 2d 647 (N.J. 1976), cert. denied sub nom.
Garger v. N.J., 429 U.S. 922 (1976).
3. Despite the court's label of "ethics committee," the committee was to function as a medical prognosis committee rather than as
a body to decide ethics.
4. Supra note 2, at 51, 355 A. 2d at 669.
5. Id. at 55, 355 A. 2d at 672.
6. 373 Mass. 728, 370N.E. 2d417 (Mass. 1977).
7. Id. at 759, 370 N.E. 2d at 424.
8. In re Dinnerstein, 6 Mass. App. Ct. 466, 380 N. E. 2d 134
(Mass. App. 1978).
9. Commissioner of Correction v. Myers, Mass. Adv. Sh.
(1979) 2523, 399N.E. 2d452 (Mass. 1979).
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10. Inre Spring, Mass. Adv. Sh. (1980) 1209,405 N.D. 2d 115
(Mass. 1980).
11. 52 N.Y. 2d363, 420N.E. 2d64 (N.Y. 1981).
12. Id. at379, 420 N.E. 2d at 72.
13. Id. at 382, 420 N.E. 2d at 73.
14. Id. at382-83,420N.E. 2dat74.
15. Id.
16. TheStorar court implies that "living wills" might be used. 52
N.Y. 2d376-77, 420N.E. 2d 70-71 (N.Y. 1981). Inre Living
Will, 5 Nova L.]. 445 (1981) encourages the use of"living wills,"
or documents executed by people during their lifetime that express
their wishes concerning medical treatment in contemplation of
illness or death. A more complete analysis of this problem would
require us to examine the institutional context in which living wills
become operative. Imagine that one spouse has signed a living will
and is now comatose; contrary to the desires expressed in a living
will, the other spouse does not want treatment discontinued. In this
situation, is it appropriate under an institutional approach for a
doctor to discontinue treatment?

